“These frameworks are usually a trap,” notes Medeiros, who also served in the Obama administration. From 2009 to 2013, he was director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia on the National Security Council (NSC), followed by his role from 2013 to 2015 as special assistant to the president and senior director for Asia on the NSC.
“The Chinese put them out there in order to bind the United States and define the terms of the relationship, but nobody on the US side has even talked about this, so we don’t really know what this new frame for the relationship is going to be.”
Much ado, little agreement
Expectations for a major agreement between both countries had risen, given the delegation of senior executives accompanying Trump to China, including Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, Apple CEO Tim Cook and Citi CEO Jane Fraser. Yet, the summit fell short of expectations. “The Trump-Xi summit felt at times like a political reality show: smooth, choreographed and unfolding almost exactly as scripted,” says George Chen, who leads The Asia Group’s Hong Kong and Taiwan offices.
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Although the summit marked the first visit by a US president to China since 2017, it produced no major agreements or concessions, including on tariffs or US export controls. “I would say it was pretty light on deliverables,” adds Campbell.
However, he believes that more substantive discussions might have occurred behind closed doors. “We’re going to need a little bit more time to make fundamental assumptions about winners and losers from the summit.”
China did extend some olive branches to the US. This includes approving an initial purchase of 200 US-made Boeing aircraft, though this is below the 300 or more planes that analysts had initially expected. There was also a commitment from the Chinese to purchase at least US$17 billion ($21.7 billion) of US agricultural products annually from 2026 to 2028, as well as to restore market access for US beef exports.
See also: US-China summit leaves Asia just a little better off
Still Trump’s show
Trump’s foreign policy can be difficult to interpret at times. In his second inauguration speech, he described himself as a “peacemaker and unifier”. “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end — and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into,” he added.
More recently, his foreign policy has appeared less aligned with that stated position. It has included military action in cases such as Iran and Venezuela, and has been characterised by a more assertive approach to goals, including potential regime change.
At the same time, China appears to be a higher priority in Trump’s foreign policy than either the Middle East or the Russia-Ukraine war. His son-in-law, Jared Kushner and US envoy Steve Witkoff have taken leading roles in negotiations related to Ukraine and Iran.
Campbell was struck by the level of familiarity that Trump had demonstrated with US-China issues from this trip. “He may not have done an enormous amount of preparation in advance of this trip, but he intuitively knows which are the issues that are delicate and sensitive within his own base and within the context, particularly of the Republican Party.”
“Coming out of this visit, it’s pretty clear that Donald Trump runs China policy,” adds Medeiros. “He’s clearly very heavily personally and politically invested in this relationship, and we should expect him to be the China desk officer going forward for the remainder of 2026.”
Rise of the G2
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Trump’s focus on China dates back to his first presidential campaign in 2016, when he pledged to take a tougher stance on Beijing. During the campaign, he accused China of manipulating its currency to support exports, describing it as “the greatest theft in the history of the world”. At a May 1, 2016, rally, he said the US could not continue to allow China to “rape our country”, a claim that drew criticism at the time.
The summit differed markedly from Trump’s earlier rhetoric on China. Trump and Xi struck a cordial tone, while Trump remained non-committal on Taiwan. Although the US did not announce major concessions, the meeting may have served China’s broader strategic objectives.
“With the Chinese putting forward this model of a constructive partnership based on strategic stability, that formulation has the subtle smell of a G2,” says Medeiros. In this case, G2 refers to a bipolar world dominated by the US and China.
“That is exactly what the Chinese want. To seed the world with this idea that Trump and Xi are going to begin to establish a global order. They will build momentum towards that idea as Xi comes to Washington in the fall.”
The rise of a G2 world would be a troubling development for US allies as well as non-aligned countries like Singapore, which prefer the stability that comes from a rules-based multilateral world order.
“In all likelihood, behind the closed doors and along the corridors of power in Asia, there is anxiety, but probably a recognition that the very worst was avoided,” says Campbell.
It is ironic that Trump’s faction now seems receptive toward the concept of a G2 world, considering how they used to brand believers of the concept as being too soft on China, notes Medeiros.
“It’s interesting to me that the G2 concept, which originally came from sort of the left of our political spectrum, is very much part of the conversation of the right, especially the MAGA (Make America Great Again) media world, and it’s not rejected or seen as a derisive concept, an accommodation to China,” he adds. “It’s sort of talked about in that media world as an aspiration to move towards, and I find that very, very worrisome.”
Keeping channels open
Perhaps the biggest positive that emerged from the entire summit is the fact that both sides are committed to keeping the conversation going. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed on May 15 that Xi has accepted Trump’s invitation to make a state visit to the US this fall.
“That in itself is unusual,” Campbell says. “The Chinese very rarely make that kind of commitment this far in advance, but both leaders want to send a signal of a process and a determination to sustain high-level discussions.”
However, the situation could still change. Trump could proceed with a planned US$14 billion arms deal with Taiwan, which China opposes. During the summit, Xi warned that mishandling Taiwan could result in a clash between the US and China.
“Both sides highlighted what they cared about most,” adds Chen. “For Xi, the priority was unmistakably Taiwan. For Trump, it was deals. The readouts from Beijing and the White House differ in tone and emphasis, but neither side contradicted the other’s account. That alone reflects a rare moment of mutual respect.”
