Internet dismantled traditional media’s distribution monopolies
For decades, media companies thought they were just content providers but in reality, they were distribution monopolies. They owned printing presses, delivery networks and, more importantly, advertising channels. Classifieds, job listings and property advertisements all flowed through them. Content was the attraction; advertising was the cash engine.
Then the internet arrived and quietly dismantled this model.
Distribution became free. Supply became infinite. And platforms like Google and Facebook did not just aggregate content — they captured the economics of attention. Advertising followed data, targeting and scale. Newspapers lost their profitable business.
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Strategic turning point: Giving away content online for free vs paywall for quality journalism
The first mistake many made was deceptively simple. They put their content online for free. In so doing, they trained an entire generation to believe that news had no price. Worse, they competed against an endless stream of similar content that was faster, cheaper and optimised for clicks. News became a commodity, and commodities have zero price.
But some did not follow the then-prevalent thought — and this is where divergence began. The winners — The New York Times, Financial Times, The Economist — understood early that digital was not a distribution problem, but a value problem. They did not chase traffic. Instead, they built pricing power. They invested in original, high-quality journalism and, crucially, drew a hard line: You pay for what you want. Subscription economics require perceived indispensability and the willingness to pay repeatedly.
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They also understood that in a world of infinite information, credibility becomes scarce. And scarcity is what you can charge for. Their product is no longer news — it is judgement, trust and clarity. Here is a summary:
1. The New York Times: It did not give away content for free, building a subscription model. Invested heavily in original, high-cost journalism. It has a strong brand for trust, in an age of information overload. NYT owns direct customer relationships (not dependent on platforms). In other words, it refused to be a “spoke in the wheel” of platforms like Google and Facebook.
2. Financial Times: Adopted paywall discipline (no “free content for ads” trap), focused on high-value niche readers (business and finance), for those willing to pay, strong data-driven subscription model and with pricing power, and maintaining credibility and independence. It moved away from the “buffet content”.
3. The Wall Street Journal: It worked because of its premium positioning and subscription revenue. It carries a global brand in financial intelligence. And the contents impact decision-making. In other words, customers will pay when content is essential and not commoditised.
4. The Economist: It carries a highly distinct voice and analysis (not news commodity). It has a loyal, global subscriber base. The scarcity of perspective, not volume of content, is its unique selling point. The Economist is read for what it means and why, not what happened.
Outlets like BuzzFeed News, Vice, Huffington Post, and even digital survivors like The Independent, pursued scale. They optimised clicks, virality and platform distribution. On paper, they looked like successes — massive audiences, global reach, cultural relevance. But scale without pricing power is an illusion.
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These companies became dependent on platforms they did not control. Algorithms dictated traffic. Advertising rates fell. Revenue per reader was non-existent. They were no longer businesses with customers — they were content suppliers in someone else’s ecosystem.
1. BuzzFeed News (shut down in 2023): It relied on platforms for traffic, virality and distribution, especially Facebook algorithms. Its journalism was weak. It had no ownership of audience or revenue and gave poor content for free.
2. Vice Media (filed for bankruptcy in 2023): It had massive scale but an ad-driven model, and was totally dependent on YouTube, Facebook and digital ads. Its cost of content was high, but it could not monetise. It mistook reach for value and fell into the trap by being a “spoke in the wheel” for platforms.
3. Huffington Post: Aggregator of free content, relying on platform traffic of Google and Facebook. This is the ultimate “buffet content” model with no pricing power.
4. Gannett/USA Today: It moved large-scale print online but continued to rely heavily on ads and volume-driven content strategy. Struggled to convert to paid online readers. This is exactly what we meant by “Going digital is not a strategy”.
5. Tribune Publishing (Chicago Tribune, LA Times): Cost-cutting resulted in declining content quality. The consequential loss of readership meant falling revenue, creating a vicious cycle.
6. Local newspapers globally: They lost their classified ads (to Craigslist, for example) and could not compete with free news aggregators or social media. They have no scale, no niche and no pricing power.
In summary, those that failed made three mistakes. They gave content away for free, destroying their own pricing power. They relied on platforms for distribution and therefore lost ownership. And they chased scale over substance and became commoditised.
In short, they did not fail because of digital. They failed because they mistook distribution for a business model.
Selling news vs insight
Closer to home, the same pattern is evident. Traditional English-language papers like The Straits Times, The Star and New Straits Times moved online, but largely remained a mass, general-news model. They did not transition from selling news to selling insight. As a result, they sit uncomfortably in the middle — not free enough to scale globally, not premium enough to command meaningful subscription revenue.
1. The Straits Times (SPH Media): Print circulation is in structural decline, and digital subscriptions are growing slowly. Content is still largely broad, general news (“buffet model”), and the perception is that it carries little differentiation without a strong editorial stance. The Singaporean daily competes with Mediacorp’s CNA (free and real time) and social media. While it is not outright failing and has government support, it is stuck in the middle, not fully commoditised and not fully premium, vulnerable to platform economics.
2. Today (shut print edition in 2020): Fully-digital, free newspaper in Singapore. Entirely ad-driven free model. It has low monetisation value, and little reason for readers to pay.
3. The Star: Once Malaysia’s largest English-language daily, it moved aggressively online early. The challenge was that Star was reliant on the advertising traffic model. Its content was truly a “buffet” of everything, totally commoditised. The digital subscription push came late. The result was high reach but low monetisation, with a rapidly declining print, while cost structure remains high. Giving content away for free, it competes on volume with no value.
4. New Straits Times: A legacy paper with strong historical positioning, but declining relevance over time. With a limited distinctive voice, it competes with free alternatives.
5. Utusan Malaysia (collapsed in 2019, later revived): Once the dominant Malay-language paper, its financial collapse was due to falling circulation and ads. It lost its distribution advantage; it has no digital business model to replace.
6. Berita Harian/Harian Metro: It has shifted towards mass digital traffic, volume driven tabloid-style. It is competing in the lowest value click segment and is vulnerable to platform algorithms.
7. Malay Mail (revived digital-only). The challenge is it competes in the free news ecosystem. With limited differentiation, it has limited monetisation. Going digital needs a business model too.
The Edge Malaysia showed resilience by narrowing its focus, targeting a specific high-value audience, and producing content that is difficult to replicate. It chose depth over breadth. The same is true of the success of Nikkei Asia.
Conclusion
The real divide in modern media is not print and digital. Media was never only about news. It is about owning attention, earning trust and converting both into pricing power. Many lost the first. Most gave away the second. Only a few captured the third.
The media that succeeded escaped commoditisation, and each built a different kind of pricing model.
They all sell different things, but none sell news.
Portfolio commentary
The Malaysian Portfolio closed flat for the week ended June 24, though faring better than the benchmark FBM KLCI, which fell 1.6%. The two winners for the week were United Plantations (+4.3%) and Hong Leong Industries (+1.3%), while the biggest losers were Public Bank (-3.6%), Maybank (-3.0%) and Kim Loong Resources (-0.7%). Total portfolio returns now stand at 223.2% since inception. This portfolio is outperforming the benchmark FBM KLCI, which is down 8.1% over the same period, by a long, long way.
The Absolute Returns Portfolio, on the other hand, fell 1.8% last week. The loss pared total portfolio returns to 26.1% since inception. The sole gainer was Berkshire Hathaway (+0.7%) while the top losers were Alibaba (-7.1%), Alphabet (-4.7%) and Microsoft (-3.5%).
The AI Portfolio too ended lower on renewed tech sell-off, down 3.7%. Total portfolio returns now stand at 24.1% since inception. Naura Technology (+8.5%) and Hewlett Packard Enterprise (+1.1%) were the two gaining stocks, while big losers were Unusual Machines, Inc (-20.2%), Alibaba (-7.1%) and Akamai Technologies, Inc (-6.6%).
Disclaimer: This is a personal portfolio for information purposes only and does not constitute a recommendation or solicitation or expression of views to influence readers to buy/sell stocks, including the particular stocks mentioned herein. It does not take into account an individual investor’s particular financial situation, investment objectives, investment horizon, risk profile and/or risk preference. Our shareholders, directors and employees may have positions in or may be materially interested in any of the stocks. We may also have or have had dealings with or may provide or have provided content services to the companies mentioned in the reports.
